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Abstract
In this paper I consider the options for structuralist approaches that
aim to incorporate an account of causation as part of giving a metaphysics
of physics. I argue that structuralists are committed to giving an account
of causation as part of giving an account of change, especially since prima
facie appealing accounts of change and causation, like causal process the-
ory, are incompatible with central structuralist commitments. I sketch
out a structuralist account of change in terms of fields as the ontologically
fundamental entities, but raise concerns about the ability of structuralists
to avoid commitment to particles as causes.
1 Introduction
There are many different philosophical accounts of causation, and there are
many different philosophical positions that go by the name of ‘structuralism’.
If we ask what kind of account of causation a structuralist can give, we need
to get clear, on the one hand, on the versions of structuralism we would like to
consider, and, on the other hand, about what it is we expect from an account
of causation.
In this talk I will be focussing on structuralists who are interested in giving
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a metaphysics of physics. Structuralists pursuing this goal aim to articulate a
metaphysical position compatible with, and perhaps indeed inspired by, fun-
damental theories in contemporary physics. I will furthermore assume that
the structuralists in question see it as part of their structuralist position that
‘structures’ are in some sense more fundamental than ‘objects’, although I do
not mean to restrict myself just to those structuralists who want to eliminate
objects altogether. Finally, I will be looking for a structuralist position that can
accommodate causation. Not all structuralists aim to do so—some might prefer
an account that explicitly excludes any causal notions.1 So the structuralism I
will be interested in for the purposes of this talk is one that tries to give an ac-
count of causation in the context of presenting a metaphysics of physics, while
remaining committed to the idea that structures are more fundamental than
objects.
One way to give a structuralist account of causation would be to go through
all extant views of causation and to opt for the one that offers the best fit be-
tween physics and the structuralist commitments. This will not be my strategy
in this talk. Instead I will be looking for a more organic way of fitting causa-
tion into a structuralist metaphysics. Many different views of causation may
be compatible with central structuralist ideas, but I believe that structuralists
can do better. Rather than taking on board whatever fits from other views, I
want to see whether they might be able to develop a view of causation that is
genuinely their own. I hope that this strategy will assuage those structuralists
who worry that having to give an account of causation is just an imposition
created by bad metaphysics2 with no proper place in physics or the philosophy
of physics.
In section one I consider different motivations a structuralist might have for
1Compare for example the sympathetic discussion of eliminativism in Ladyman and Ross
(2007).
2On the notion of ‘bad metaphysics’, see again Ladyman and Ross (2007).
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wanting to give an account of causation, and suggest that the central task for
a structuralist account of causation is to give an account of change. In section
two I articulate what needs to be done to give an account of change, why
that might present a challenge for structuralism. In section three I consider
a mediating strategy for accounts of change and causation in the context of
modern physics: causal process theory. I argue that this strategy does not work
for the structuralist. In section four I offer a purely structuralist response to the
problems outlined in section two. I argue that structuralists need to insist on
building their account around the idea of dynamical structures, but that they
have to give up the idea of modeling those structures on processes in the sense
of world-lines. In section five I argue that even for this genuinely structuralist
response, giving causation its due means accepting particles into the ontology,
although not as persisting particulars.
2 Why should structuralists care about causa-
tion?
A structuralist might have a number of different motivations for wanting to
include causation into her view, and depending on the exact motivation, there
are different desiderata an account of causation has to fulfill.
Structuralists are often confronted with the charge that on their view, there is
no distinction between mathematical and physical structure. While some struc-
turalists endorse this idea, and argue for a purely mathematical structuralism,
many others try to find a way of articulating a structuralism that distinguishes
between physical and mathematical structures. A structuralist account of cau-
sation might offer a means by which to distinguish mathematical from physical
structures: physical structures are in some sense causal, mathematical struc-
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tures, by contrast, are not.
A structuralist whose main motivation for incorporating causation into her
view is the desire to distinguish mathematical and physical structures will be
looking for an account of causation that rules out that mathematical entities
could have causal attributes, for example by attributing causal powers to phys-
ical structures. Mathematical entities don’t push or pull; they don’t have the
power to heat water or to attract metal. While most philosophers would be in-
clined to agree that mathematical entities are acausal in that sense, the notion
of causation at work here is fairly robust. The question is, on the one hand,
whether a robust notion of causation has a home in fundamental physics, and
on the other, whether sense can be made of the attribution of causal properties
to structures. And Michael Esfeld has of course argued that this is possible.
(2009)
Other structuralists see naturalism as the main reason for giving an account
of causation.3 A naturalistic metaphysics is the attempt to accept into one’s
ontology only entities ‘sanctioned’ by science. What it takes for an entity to be
sanctioned by science is itself a non-trivial question naturalists need to address,
but a fairly standard criterion is that naturalists are committed to all entities
that feature irreducibly in scientific explanations. Since there seem to be ir-
reducible causal relations described by sciences other than physics, an account
of causation that is only suitable for physics will not be sufficient to account
for such irreducible causal relations in other sciences. Accordingly, naturalis-
tically motivated structuralists have rejected the idea of altogether eliminating
causation from their account. Instead they are faced with the problem of devel-
oping an account of causation that is sufficiently structuralist while being broad
enough to cover causation across different science.
3This is main motivation for Ladyman and Ross (2007) for rejecting eliminativism about
causation.
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A third motivation for incorporating causation into a structuralist meta-
physics is to give an account of change. Structuralism has been accused of
failing to give an account of change, since understanding change, it is alleged,
requires objects that undergo change (Chakravartty, 2003). Giving an account
of change is tied to causation insofar as giving an account of causation is needed
to explain what brings about change. The challenge for the structuralist here
is both to give a structuralist substitute for an object based account of what
it means to undergo change, as well as giving an account of what brings about
change.
Depending on the motivation for giving a structuralist account of causation,
the desiderata for such an account will be somewhat different. For example, the
problem of causal asymmetry of higher level causal relations plays an important
role in the project of reconciling the causal relations of higher level entities with
the time-reversible laws of physics, but causal asymmetry need not be the main
concern of those trying to distinguish physical from mathematical structure, nor
is it obvious that it should be central to a structuralist account of change.
While the different desiderata are not in obvious contradiction with one an-
other, and in some cases may even overlap, trying to fulfill all of them nonethe-
less sets the bar very high for giving an account of causation in structuralist
terms. Having isolated these different motivations, I suggest that it is a good
idea to start explicitly from one of them, and to develop an account of causation
on that basis. Perhaps that account will do justice to the other motivations as
well, but if not, we shouldn’t despair. For the rest of the talk I will proceed
from the motivation of giving an account of change.
The main reason for this choice is that I think giving such an account is
central to the whole structuralist project of providing a metaphysics for modern
physics. The description and explanation of change is central to physics, and
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is accordingly central to meta-physics. Naturalistic closure, by contrast, is an
additional aim, which structuralists may or may not adopt. Whether or not
the account developed will suffice to distinguish mathematical from physical
structure is also a matter I will leave open at this point. Those who wish to
draw such a distinction will of course embrace an account of causation that
allows them to do so, but even if the account of causation fails to be robust
enough to accomplish this goal, they can still try to find a different way of
distinguishing physical structure. For the rest of this talk, then, I shall only be
concerned with causation insofar as it can contribute to a structuralist account
of change.
3 Change as problem for structuralism
The difficulty for structuralists in giving an account of change, say critics of
structuralism, is that our ordinary accounts of change depend on objects. In
traditional terms, such an account would of course have been given in terms
of a substance, which remains self-identical while undergoing various changes
in (some of) its properties: changing position, turning blue, and so forth. But
even the contemporary debate, carried out between three-dimensionalists and
four-dimensionalists is a debate over whether persisting particulars endure or
perdure, that is to say, over whether we should say an object persists by being
wholly present at different times, or by extending over different times by having
different ‘temporal parts’ at different ‘temporal locations’. Whichever of these
two accounts of persistence may ultimately be more appealing, it is clear that
both aim to offer accounts of what it is for an object to persist over time. Since
an account of persistence over time is usually taken to be an integral part of
any account of change, accounts of change ultimately still seem to depend on
objects.
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Persistence, however, is only one half of an account of change. The other half
is an account of what brings about changes, that is, an account of causation.
Here we similarly find that objects seem to play a central role. Traditionally,
again, we find substances as causes, as bringing about change.
The majority of contemporary philosophers prefer to see events as the relata
of the causal relation, but that does not mean purging the account of objects.
Events here are typically occurrences like Billy throwing a rock or the shattering
of a window, not the puristic intersections of world-lines in special relativity.
In other words, events are occurrences some of the constituents of which are
objects. That is unsurprising, and not per se objectionable, since the goal of
most theories of causation is to analyze our ordinary concept of causation, which
of course deals with rather ordinary occurrences, which we in turn do typically
understand in terms of ordinary objects.
Structuralists do not aim to offer a specifically structuralist account of ordi-
nary notions of causation. Nor should they be concerned to offer a full-blown
substitute for an account of the persistence of objects, since objects, after all,
are perhaps to be eliminated from the ontology altogether, and in any case are
not supposed to be fundamental. The question is, instead: what exactly should
structuralists aim to accomplish with an account of change? Given the com-
mitment to giving an adequate metaphysics for physics, it seems clear that a
structuralist should develop a model that accounts for change as described by
physics.
The main decision for a structuralist will be whether to emulate the persis-
tence based account of ‘object oriented metaphysics’ by taking structures to be
the (relatively) stable relata of causal relations, or whether to opt for a radically
different approach, in which causal relations don’t connect structures, but are
themselves a relation in the structure.
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In the former case the structuralist account will have a two-tiered structure,
explaining on the one hand what it means for a structure to persist, and on
the other hand what it means for two or more structures to interact. The two
advantages of this strategy are that the structuralist account will match the
‘object oriented’ account fairly closely, and that it is (accordingly) relatively
clear how to go about developing such an account. Possible disadvantages of
this strategy are that even if it can be established that structures are capable
of playing all the roles required by such a two-tiered account, the motivation
for going structuralist might be lost. A structuralist will have shown that her
account can match the demands of ‘object oriented metaphysics’, instead of
showing that the demands are misplaced and that a structuralist account is
suitable for responding to different, more important demands. A natural place
to look for such demands in physics. If it can be shown that physics itself
makes demands that make this two-tiered structure unsuitable, structuralists
would have a reason to reject the ‘object oriented’ account, and a motivation
for their own, different, strategy.
In the next section I will point out prima facie problems contemporary
physics poses for accounts of changed based on persisting particulars. I will dis-
cuss a view of causation that takes into account these developments in physics,
while retaining the two-tiered structure described above. I argue that this ‘me-
diating’ strategy is unsuitable for appropriation by the structuralist. I take this
as a motivation to look for a genuinely structuralist alternative, which gives up
on the two-tiered structure, in section four.
8
4 Causal Process Theory—A mediating strat-
egy
Contemporary physics seems to challenge the dichotomy between stable, persist-
ing objects on one side, and interactions among them on the other. While this
division fits the relationships described, for example, by Newton’s first and sec-
ond laws respectively, it is not immediately clear what, if anything, corresponds
to stable, inertially moving bodies in the different areas of modern physics.
Special Relativity seems to teach us that there is no absolute distinction
between temporal and spatial directions, since any such distinction requires
the introduction of one of several possible coordinate systems. So what does it
mean to say that an object persists, if by persistence we mean its remaining self-
same over time? Furthermore, bodies are no longer the fundamental entities
of physics. Instead we have both particles and fields as causally efficacious
entities to countenance. It is unclear, especially taking into account the quantum
context in addition to relativity theory, how we should metaphysically conceive
of either their persistence or their interactions. Post-Newtonian physics, then,
poses a challenge for traditional accounts of persistence, change, and causation.
A mediating strategy is causal process theory. Process theory retains the
two-tired structure described above by distinguishing between causal processes
on the one hand, and causal interactions on the other. According to a recent
version of causal process theory, a causal process is “a world line of an object
that possesses a conserved quantity” (Dowe, 2000, 90), and a causal interac-
tion is “an intersection of world lines that involves exchange of a conserved
quantity” (Dowe, 2000, 90). Using conserved quantities as the characteristic
feature of causal processes and interactions is Dowe’s particular innovation; it
is his attempt at responding to what is perceived to be the greatest difficulty
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for a process theory of causation: the ability to distinguish causal processes
from ‘pseudo’ processes. For our purposes more relevant than the distinction
between pseudo processes and causal processes (or Dowe’s way of drawing the
distinction) is the two-partite structure of the account, which is common to all
causal process theories. This distinction corresponds roughly to the distinction
between changing over time without external influence, and changing through
external influence. Distinguishing between internal and external influences com-
mits the causal process theorist to an account of identity over time, as we shall
see in more detail below.
Can a structuralist appropriate the process theorist approach in dealing with
change and causation? One strategy, let’s call it Option A, is to find the struc-
turalism in process theory by taking structure to be what is stable about a
process.4 Since what makes a causal process a causal process, is that it must
be capable of transmitting something, such a process must be stable, and this
stability is to be understood as structural stability. The conserved quantities
account would then be viewed as just the most recent way of articulating what
it means for a process to have a stable structure. A structuralist could try to
argue that process theorists give a structuralist account of causation insofar as
they explain causal relations in terms of causal processes, and causal processes
are defined as structure preserving ones. So structure would appear to play a
major role in the account of causation.
There are two problems with this way of viewing process theory as a struc-
turalist account. First of all, it does not address the problem pointed out above,
namely that causal processes are nonetheless defined in terms of objects and
their properties. What is preserved, in the conserved quantities account, is the
property of an object: it has the same conserved quantity. Even if we attempt
4See for example Rueger (2006) in the context of developing a process theory, although
not with a specifically structuralist agenda.
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to give a structuralist analysis of conserved quantities, however, this approach
is still one that explains causation ultimately in terms of objects and their prop-
erties.
Second, it is unclear what the connection between structure preservation and
causation is supposed to be. What seems needed is that processes be stable, but
why that stability should be a structural as a opposed to a qualitative stability,
or why we should consider the currently proposed candidates for stability to be
structural in any significant sense, is unclear. Indeed, if we look at Russell’s
original proposal, it is clear that he thinks structure is only one way in which
a process can be stable: “Throughout a given causal line, there may always
be constancy of quality, constancy of structure, or gradual change in either,
but no sudden change of any considerable magnitude” (Russell, 1948, 477).
What makes a process (or a causal line) stable, is that changes to it are not
sudden, but that criterion by itself does not suffice to conclude that what is
preserved in causal processes is structure. More importantly, even if we give
a structural characterization of what’s being preserved, it is not the fact that
what is preserved is structure that makes the process causal, but the fact that
something is preserved. Option A, then, does not appear to be a good strategy
for structuralist appropriations of causal process theory.
The second approach, Option B, is more radical. Instead of taking the
structural aspect of a process theory to be found in what is preserved or stable
in a causal process, the process itself is taken to be the structure. A process, on
this option, is a dynamical structure, not something that preserves the structure
of something else.
This second approach faces two main obstacles: (a) the reference to objects in
the definitions of processes as world lines, and (b) the temptation to decompose
a process into a sequence of events. The former is obviously an obstacle, because
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it would make objects once again fundamental; the latter is an obstacle because
events themselves look like particulars, not structures.5 Process theorists, and
most certainly process theorists who want to be structuralists, need to insist
that processes are more fundamental than events. A standard way of doing so
is to suggest that events are the intersections of two or more processes. But
why should we not go the other way?
Processes and events seem interdefinable.6 An event is an intersection of two
processes, but a process seems to be nothing more than a sequence of events.
As Russell puts it: “A ‘causal line’, as I wish to define the term, is a temporal
series of events so related that, given some of them, something can be inferred
about the others whatever may be happening elsewhere” (Russell, 1948, 477).
Russell’s definition is offered in terms of our ability to draw inferences about
what happens to other events from some of the events in the series. Events
that afford us inferential connections in this way form causal lines. Unless we
want to read this in a strictly subjectivist fashion, however, there seems to be
a legitimate question: what is it about these series of events that allows us to
draw inferences about them? Russell does not offer an answer to that question,
and one suspects he doesn’t want to do so, but a metaphysical account cannot
refuse to answer this question.
The idea that a process can instead be defined not as a series of events but
as the world-line of an object, is a natural attempt to answer this question. By
defining a process as the world-line of an object, processes can be individuated,
5Structuralists might of course attempt to offer a ‘structuralist’ interpretation of either
events or objects in this context. But this does not seem like a promising strategy at this point.
After all, re-interpreting apparent particulars like objects and events in terms of structures
seemed most promising if we could understand them, in the case of objects, as the stable
results of causal processes, and in the case of events, as the intersections of causal processes.
So the best structural candidates for doing the reinterpretative work are exactly the ones
whose independence from objects and events is under attack.
6In a similar way in which space-time worms and temporal parts/stages seem inter defin-
able.
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and gerrymandering of processes from just any events is avoided.7 Which events
form a process is defined by which events are part of the world line of a particular
object - we know which events to look for because we know which object we are
tracking. This means, of course, that the process account here continues to rely
on objects, and more importantly, on persisting objects at a crucial point in
the account. In talking about the world-line of an object we are talking about
the persistence of an object, albeit in a nicely relativistic manner, and it is in
doing so that we prioritize the sequence of events over the individual events
out of which it is composed. Furthermore, we can say which events get to be
part of the same process by first individuating the objects. Without defining
processes as word lines of objects, then, a process theory can neither individuate
processes, nor prioritize processes over events.
Since building persisting objects into the individuation criteria for processes
is clearly unacceptable for the structuralist, a structuralist appropriation of the
process account a long the lines of option B also seems fraught with obstacles.
But Option B introduced an important departure from previous approaches
to causation, which I think should be taken on board by structuralists. A
structuralist should think of causal relations as part of the structure she is taking
to be fundamental, instead of thinking of structures as relata of an independently
characterized causal relation. The key to this is to understand structures as
dynamic, but as the argument above suggests, perhaps not as processes in the
sense of world lines.
7Dowe is especially explicit about this; he in particular rejects time-wise gerrymanders,
which commits him to a notion of identity over time independent of causal relations.
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5 A genuinely structuralist approach
The world-line, as a generalized trajectory, is still tied to the notion of a per-
sisting object traveling on that trajectory. If structuralists aim to understand
change and causality in terms of dynamical structures, they need to give up on
the idea of a process in the sense of a world-line as the paradigmatic case of
a dynamical structure. A natural alternative are fields.8 A plausible strategy
for structuralists to give a genuinely structuralist approach to change and cau-
sation is to show that change and causation in the context field theory are not
well understood in the terms offered by metaphysical views that put persisting
particulars at the heart of their ontology.
A first point to be established, then, is that fields do not persist. A field is, by
definition, a structure extended both in space and time. Since there is no princi-
pled difference between spatial and temporal variations in fields, fields cannot be
said to endure. Enduring entities are wholly present at different times, whereas
they are not wholly present at different locations in space. Endurantists are
committed to the idea that there is a difference in temporal change and spatial
variation. Fields are not entities for which such a distinction is appropriate.9
Should we say that fields perdure, then? A perduring entity is one that has
temporal parts at different temporal locations, just as it has different spatial
parts at different spatial locations. But it seems odd to say of fields that they
have parts. A field is a vector quantity, which can have different strengths and
directions at different locations (in the classical theory these locations will be
points). But while we can of course distinguish the strength or direction of
the field in different regions, it makes little sense to speak of these regions as
different parts of the field. Certainly in the classical case we want to distinguish
8Structuralists have opted for a field ontology on other occasions, see for example French
and Ladyman 2003.
9Notice that this does not mean that there are no enduring entities. It just means that
fields are not enduring entities.
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between a field of certain values present in a region of space(-time) and the
region of space(-time) itself. Similarly, different fields can be present within the
same region of space-time (e.g. electromagnetic and gravitational fields). It
would be odd to say that the two fields share their parts. The difficulty arises
because fields are not bound to material carriers. They do not need bodies to
inhere in, and our conception of parthood seems deeply bound up with the idea
of material bodies. Material bodies that can (in principle) be composed and
taken apart, that is to say, that can be moved rigidly and independently from
their surroundings. Field theory ultimately calls into question that conception
of rigid motion.
If fields cannot be said to have temporal parts because they ultimately don’t
have parts, they don’t perdure in the sense of perdurance theory. As we’ve seen
above, fields also don’t endure. Since perdurance and endurance are offered the
two ways in which entities might persist, it seems that we should conclude that
fields don’t persist. A slightly better way of putting this would be to say that
fields are dynamical entities to which the notion of persistence does not apply.
In a sense that should not come as a surprise. Persistence is tied to the notion
of identity over time, including in particular the case of identity over time in
spite of changes in properties. But since in the case of a field, which lacks a
‘material basis’, it makes no sense to distinguish between changing properties
and stable ‘underlying’ thing, it is unsurprising that persistence doesn’t appear
to be applicable. Changing field values are not the changing properties of an
otherwise self-same entity. They, and the relations among them, are the entity.
Since the field values in one location depend on/are influenced by the field
values in the vicinity, it makes sense to speak of a field as a structure. Hence it
is unsurprising that structuralists have sometimes suggested that the structures
they take to be fundamental are in fact fields.
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If adopting a field ontology means giving up on persistence for the most
fundamental entities, and doing so is what structuralists intended to do, does
that mean structuralists cannot give an account of change? I don’t think so.
Fields may not persist, but they do change. They change not through locomo-
tion on well defined trajectories, or by changing their properties, but by being
themselves dynamical structures. Fields are dynamical structures in the fol-
lowing two senses: they can vary spatio-temporally, and they can interact with
particles.
Spatio-temporal variation, as we said above, should not be understood as
having different parts in different spatial or temporal locations. Fields (can)
have different strength and direction at different locations. That much is un-
controversial. The difficult questions for a structuralist, but really for anybody
who wants to speak about fields as dynamical structures, is to say how this
variation of field values is brought about. That is to say, the crucial challenge
in describing fields as dynamical structures is not that fields don’t persist, but
to explain why there are fields at all, and why their strength and direction can
vary.
The second sense in which fields are dynamical structures is that they can
interact with particles. One way to think about the interaction of a field with
a particle is to think of the particle is traveling ‘through’ a field on a trajec-
tory. Spatio-temporal variations in the field will affect the particle’s trajectory.
Thinking of it that way means to assume the field itself as somehow ‘given’ or
present10, and the particle as a persisting particular on a well-defined trajec-
tory. It is easy to miss that even in this description we are attributing causal
powers to the field, that is, we describe it as a dynamical structure in the second
sense. Since fields, on this picture, bring about changes to the trajectories of
particles by varying spatio-temporally, we can moreover say that fields are dy-
10That is, to bracket the worries just raised in the previous paragraph.
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namical structures in the second sense, in virtue of being dynamical structures
in the first sense. This description gives primary causal powers to the fields: it
is because they are spatio-temporally varying structures that we can attribute
to them the causal power of changing the trajectory of appropriate particles.11
6 Some concerns and refinements
In the previous section I’ve articulated a genuinely structuralist approach to
change and causation in terms of fields as the fundamental physical entity. While
this approach can help us to appreciate the distinctive features of a structuralist
account, namely the idea that change and causation are to be understood exclu-
sively in terms of dynamical structures without persistence conditions, it also
raises some new questions about the relationship between particles and fields.
I’ve suggested that structuralists should take fields as the fundamental en-
tities, and I have described them as dynamical structures in two senses: as
varying over space-time, and as influencing the trajectories of test charges trav-
eling through them. Particles traveling on trajectories are bound to raise two
types of objections. On the one hand, purely philosophically, it might be argued
that this means that the structuralist account of fields as dynamical structures
needs to be supplemented with an account of the persistence of particles after
all. On the other hand, from the perspective of physics one might object that
we have to give up the idea of particles traveling on well-defined trajectories as
soon as we take into account quantum considerations.
It turns out, that the combination of these objections is actually an advan-
tage for the structuralist. For she might agree with the philosophical objection
that the (semi-)classical account of field-particle interaction given in the previ-
11Ultimately this power resides in the field-quantities: it is because the particle and the
field have the appropriate quantities that they can interact. Not all fields interact with all
particles.
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ous section indeed continues to be committed to persisting particulars in the
form of particles traveling on well-defined trajectories. The structuralist should
hence be grateful if a reason can be given for discharging that commitment.
Quantum considerations seem to offer just such a reason. So instead of feeling
battered from two sides, the structuralist should simply endorse the consider-
ations from quantum physics and insist that descriptions of particles traveling
through fields on well-defined trajectories are at best a semi-classical approxi-
mate model useful in certain circumstances, but not the account from which we
should derive our best metaphysics. The structuralist’s answer to the philosoph-
ical objection is then that our best physics ultimately gives us an independent
reason for thinking that persistence has no special role to play in our account
of change and causation even if we retain particles as elements of the ontology.
Quantum particles are not persisting particulars.
Nonetheless, this victory for the structuralist will come at a cost. Giving
up the classical description of particles as persistent particulars means we have
to reconsider the classical descriptions of fields as well. In particular, it means
giving up the idea that fields are dynamical entities in the second sense in virtue
of influencing the trajectories of particles traveling through them.
Classical fields are good candidates for fundamental entities because they are
self-sustaining, they don’t need a material substratum to ‘live in’. That does
not mean, however, that they are causally independent as well. Instead, moving
charges are sources of fields! In the descriptions of the previous section, we’ve
ignored effects of the traveling particle on the surrounding field as negligible,
but once we decide to go in for a full-blown quantum field description, this ide-
alization no longer seems appropriate. Instead it seems we ought to be treating
field and particles as being in constant interaction with each other, with neither
being causally ‘more fundamental’.
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This does not sink the structuralist’s account of either change or causation,
since the most important aspect remains intact: an account of change in con-
temporary physics will proceed in terms of dynamical structures, not persistent
particulars. It does, however, count against structuralist approaches that aim
to eliminate particles from the ontology. Contrary to the original criticism, the
problem does not arise from the alleged need for objects to account for change,
or even for objects as carriers of the causally efficacious properties. Instead the
key point is that quantum field theory tells us that particles need fields, and
fields need particles to sustain each other causally. Neither is causally active un-
less they are thought of as being causally interactive, and the interactions take
place between particles and fields. It is possible that we will eventually develop
a theory that eliminates either particles or fields from that interaction, but as of
right now, that’s not the kind of theory we have. Quantum field theory suggests
that particles and fields do not exist independent of each other because of their
ongoing causal interaction. Structuralists rightly warn us against treating the
particles in these theories as persisting particulars, but they should conceded
that the fields cannot be thought of as dynamical structures independently of
the particles either.
7 Conclusion
In this talk I’ve considered the options for a structuralist account of causation
whose main goal is to give a structuralist account of change. I have argued that
the challenge to account for change arises from within the structuralist project
of giving a metaphysics for physics, and I’ve shown that structuralists cannot
simply adopt existing views like perdurantism or process theory to complete
their account. Instead, I’ve argued, structuralists need to develop their own
account of change, starting from fields as the fundamental entity. Fields are
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paradigmatic dynamical structures, and hence suited to the task of giving a
structuralist account of change. While this gives structuralists a promising way
of articulating a genuinely structuralist account of change, however, questions
about the causation and fields should lead structuralists to a more cautious
stance vis-a-vis the existence of particles.
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